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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper, which accompanies the National Audit Office report on benefit sanctions in the UK, provides an 
evaluation of the labour market impact of benefit sanctions for Work Programme claimants, a large welfare-to-
work programme targeting the long-term unemployed in the UK. We use rich administrative data from the 
Department for Work & Pensions which include information on the benefit and employment history of claimants. 
We exploit the random assignment of claimants to different Work Programme providers and the variation in 
sanction referrals, across providers, to estimate an instrumental variables model. The model allows us to identify 
the impact of sanctions on benefit receipt, likelihood of employment and earnings. We find that sanctions make 
jobs more likely for Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants but less likely for sick and disabled claimants of 
Employment and Support Allowance. In addition, our results on earnings suggest that Jobseeker’s Allowance 
claimants are often moving to jobs with shorter hours and/or lower wages. Our analysis provides the first UK 
evidence, using individual level data, on the impact of benefit sanctions on the labour market outcomes of 
sanctioned claimants and contributes to the very limited research on the impact of benefit sanctions on the labour 
market outcomes of claimants with disabilities. 
 
 
 
JEL classification: J65; J68 
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Introduction 
 
1 This appendix accompanies our value-for-money report, Benefit sanctions.1 In our 
report we concluded that the Department for Work & Pensions (the Department) should 
use its data to assess outcomes and support better understanding of the impacts of 
benefit sanctions. 
 
2 To demonstrate the opportunities for better use of the Department’s data, we 
assessed the impact of sanctions on employment outcomes. We took advantage 
of a natural experiment in the design of the Work Programme – a large welfare-to-
work programme.2 We found statistically significant effects after a sanction is 
imposed, including on a claimant’s probability of employment, number of days 
employed and number of days neither employed nor claiming benefits. 
 
3 As with any research of this kind, there are limitations in our analysis. Care  
should be taken in drawing conclusions from it. In particular, our work measures 
direct effects on people who are sanctioned and does not measure indirect effects 
such as deterrence. In this appendix we set out our methods and findings, and 
discuss the interpretation and limitations of our approach. 
 
4 In developing this analysis we benefited from informal advice and comments 
from several academic experts and the Department’s own analysts. However, our 
work has not been fully peer reviewed. This appendix should be treated as a working 
paper or other preliminary statement of findings. 
 
Note 
 
5 The Department has expressed caution about the results of our analysis on the 
grounds that they are preliminary and not extensively peer reviewed. Its officials 
have reviewed our calculations, and their comments on methods are reflected in the 
discussion about limitations of the analysis. Although the Department has not 
identified significant flaws in the approach or calculations, any complex analysis of 
this kind 
 
is subject to technical and methodological judgements. In particular, the impact of 
sanctions on Employment and Support claimants is previously unexamined in the 
literature. We agree that more work is required in this area and explain our approach 
to help inform further analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Comptroller and Auditor General, Benefit sanctions, Session 2016-17, HC 628, National Audit Office, November 
2016. This note sets out more detail on the methods underlying the findings in paragraphs 3.9 to 3.11 of our report. 
2 The Department introduced the Programme in 2011. It aims to help people at risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed. The Department will stop referrals to the Programme in April 2017. 
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Objectives 
 
6 We aimed to estimate how receiving a sanction affects claimants’ employment 
outcomes. In theory there are several different effects that could arise, including the 
direct result of receiving sanctions, and deterrence effects on those who change their 
behaviour to avoid sanctions (Figure 1). 
 
7 These theoretical effects are uncertain so it is important to assess the empirical 
evidence for the effect of sanctions on each outcome. Academic research papers 
from the UK and other countries confirm that sanctions have mixed effects. While 
they lead to higher employment, those jobs can be shorter and provide lower 
earnings than claimants would have received otherwise. Sanctions can also cause 
higher inactivity, where people neither work nor claim.3 
 
8 Our analysis, like most of the international literature on the topic, considers the 
direct impact of a sanction on the employment outcomes and benefit take-up of 
people who receive sanctions. We are interested in the marginal impact of higher or 
lower sanction use, not the absolute effect of removing sanctions altogether. We do 
not measure deterrence effects. 
 
The Work Programme 
 
9 We analysed Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants and Employment and Support 
Allowance claimants participating in the Work Programme, the Department’s 
externally‑run welfare-to-work programme. The Department introduced the Work 
Programme in 2011 to raise employment rates among long-term benefit recipients.4 
People take part in the Programme for up to two years, and participation is 
compulsory for some.  
 
Figure 1  
Possible effects of sanctions1 
 
Type of effect Duration of Post-unemployment Job stability 
 unemployment earnings  
Direct (ex post) Decrease Uncertain Uncertain 
Indirect/deterrence Decrease Uncertain Uncertain 
(ex ante)    
 
Note  
1 Theoretical predictions draw from Patrick Arni, Rafael Lalive and Jan van Ours, ‘How effective are unemployment 
benefit sanctions? Looking beyond unemployment exit’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 28, 2013, pp. 1153-
78. Arni et al (2013) also hypothesise that for some groups benefit sanctions may discourage searching for jobs. 
 
Source: National Audit Office  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 The impact of benefit sanctions has been studied in a number of countries, including the Netherlands, Germany, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain and the United States. See Figure 21 in our report Benefit 
sanctions. 
4 The Department will stop referrals to the Programme in April 2017. 
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10 The Work Programme accounts for a large number of sanctions (Figure 2). 
There are substantial differences between providers in how they use sanctions. They 
place different amounts of emphasis on sanctions as a tool to improve claimants’ 
employment outcomes, and give different amounts of discretion to individual advisers.5 
This variation allows us to analyse whether people with similar skills and opportunities 
achieve different employment outcomes, simply because they have different 
likelihoods of receiving sanctions. 
 
11 To run the Programme the Department divided Great Britain into 18 areas, 
called ‘contract package areas’. Within each area two or three providers are 
responsible for helping Work Programme participants to move into lasting 
employment. The types of support provided vary, including help with CVs, interview 
training and skills development. Providers can operate in more than one ‘contract 
package area’ so some providers have multiple contracts. 
 
12 The Department pays providers based on how many claimants gain lasting 
employment within a given period, typically 24 months. Within areas, the 
Department allocates claimants randomly to providers. It does this to ensure 
providers have similar claimants. Prime providers subcontract their services to 
around 400 subcontractors. 
 
 
Figure 2  
Work Programme sanctions and outcomes, June 2011 to March 2016 
 
 Jobseeker’s Employment and Total 
 Allowance claimants Support Allowance  
  claimants  
Mandatory participants1 1,473,000 261,000 1,734,000 
Sanctions1 673,000 73,000 746,000 
Per participant 0.5 0.3 – 
% of all sanctions 23 80 – 
Sanction referrals1 2,268,000 296,000 2,564,000 
Per participant 1.5 1.1 – 
% of all referrals 36 91 – 
Job outcomes1 485,000 30,000 515,000 
Contract package areas 18 18 – 
Contracts 40 40 – 
 
Note  
1 Rounded to the nearest thousand. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions official statistics  
 
 
 
 
 
5 See, Department for Work & Pensions, Work Programme evaluation: operation of the commissioning model, 
finance and programme delivery’, December 2014. 
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13 Providers have some freedom to decide what support to offer and which 
activities to make compulsory. Providers make sanction referrals to the Department if 
claimants do not complete compulsory activities. The Department then decides 
whether to impose sanctions. 
 
Data 
 
14 In our analysis we examine individual-level administrative data on outcomes for 
people who receive a sanction. These micro-data allow us to construct individuals’ 
histories of claiming, employment, sanctions and participation in the Work 
Programme. Our data come from the Department’s Work and Pensions Longitudinal 
Study which draws on several sources of data (Figure 3). 
 
15 Other research on sanctions in Great Britain uses aggregate data to study the 
relationship between sanctions and employment outcomes.6 Using aggregate-level 
data to examine individual-level behaviour is difficult. In contrast, using micro-data on 
individual benefit claimants allows us to compare similar claimants. By comparing 
similar claimants we are in a stronger position to analyse the causal effect of 
sanctions on employment outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 3  
Data: sources 
 
Data type Source Further details 
Claimant sanction history Decision Making and DWP system 
 Appeals System  
 Decision Making and DWP system 
 Appeals Case Recorder  
   
Benefit claim histories National Benefits Database DWP system 
   
Employment and earnings Real Time Information Extract from HMRC held by DWP 
   
Work Programme Work Programme DWP system 
participation Analytical Dataset  
 
Note  
1 DWP:Department for Work & Pensions; HMRC:HM Revenue & Customs.     
2 Source: National Audit Office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Rachel Loopstra et al, ‘Do punitive approaches to unemployment benefit recipients increase welfare exit and 
employment? A cross-area analysis of UK sanctioning reforms’, Sociology working paper 2015-01, 
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2015. 
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Sample selection 
 
16 In selecting our sample we followed the method used in Boockmann et al 
(2014).7 Specifically, our treatment group is made up of people who, during our 
period of observation, received one and only one sanction (Figure 4). We wanted to 
analyse the impact of a claimant’s first sanction, so we excluded people who had 
received sanctions between joining the Programme and the start of our period of 
analysis. 
 
17 Our control group is made up of people who meet the same conditions as  
the treatment group, except that they did not receive a sanction during the period of 
observation. Following Boockmann et al (2014), we compared the control group with 
the treatment group by creating outcome variables. To do this we drew randomly 
from a uniform distribution of sanction dates between February and May 2014. As 
with the treatment group, we only included people with an active Jobseeker’s 
Allowance or Employment and Support Allowance claim on the day of the 
hypothetical sanction. 
 
 
Figure 4  
Data: selection 
 
 Conditions for selecting data 
Population Work Programme participants continuously enrolled between 1 February 2014 
 and 31 May 2014. 
  
Benefits claimed Jobseeker’s Allowance or Employment and Support Allowance. 
  
Sanction history No sanctions between joining the Work Programme and 1 February 2014. 
 No more than one sanction between 1 February 2014 and 31 May 2014. 
 No limit on number of sanctions after 1 June 2014. 
  
Employment history No earned income between 1 April 2013 and 1 February 2014. 
 No pension income. 
 No employment spells paid irregularly or less often than monthly. 
 Not employed on the day the sanction was imposed. 
  
Exclusions Exclude if no National Insurance number recorded, to ensure matching to real-time 
 information data on earnings. 
 Exclude if claim not active on the day of the sanction. 
  
Assumptions End dates estimated where missing. 
 
Source: National Audit Office  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Bernhard Boockmann, Stephan L Thomsen, and Thomas Walter, ‘Intensifying the use of benefit sanctions – an effective tool 
to shorten welfare receipt and speed up transitions to employment?’, IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 3:21, 2014. 
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18 We use the period from 1 February 2014 to 31 May 2014 for two reasons.  
First, employment data is of much higher quality after October 2013 when the roll-
out of the Real-Time Information system was completed. Second, people are less 
likely to be referred for sanctions over the Christmas period, and we did not want to 
look at a time period with unusual sanction patterns. 
 
19 We analyse Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support 
Allowance claimants separately. The Jobseeker’s Allowance sample has 95,374 
individuals. The Employment and Support Allowance sample has 130,582 
individuals. 
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Approach and model specification 
 
 
Specifying the model 
 
20 A simple comparison of the outcomes of people who did and did not receive 
sanctions would not tell us how claimants are affected by receiving a sanction. This is 
because people who receive sanctions may have different unobserved characteristics 
that make them both more likely to receive sanctions and less likely to find work. 
 
We needed a way to distinguish the effect of receiving a sanction from other 
factors affecting outcomes. 
 
Using an instrumental variables approach 
 
21 To address the problem of unobserved characteristics we take what is known as 
an instrumental variables approach. Instrumental variables are commonly used by 
social scientists as a way of controlling for unobserved characteristics. This approach 
allows us to identify the causal impact of sanctions on employment and benefit 
uptake. We followed the method used by Boockmann et al (2014) to analyse the 
impact of sanctions on claimants in Germany. 
 
22 Our instrumental variable is the average sanction referral rate for each 
contract between February and May 2014. The instrument allows us to exploit 
variation in provider sanction referral rates within the same contract package 
area. Because providers have different sanction referral rates, we can treat 
random assignment to providers as a natural experiment and compare outcomes 
for otherwise similar participants who are assigned to different providers. 
 
23 We estimate a two-stage least squares regression model. This model estimates  
a relationship between the fitted probability that someone receives a sanction, 
with each of our outcomes of interest: employment status, days claiming, days 
working and earnings (Figure 5). Within our model we control for a number of 
other variables (Figure 6 on page 9). 
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Figure 5  
Specification: model 
 
First stage model 
 
Si = δZi + αXi+εi 
 
Xi is a vector of covariates, Zi a continuous instrument, Si is a dummy 
variable showing whether individual i has received a sanction (Si = 1) or not 
(Si = 0) and εi is an error term with a conditional mean of zero. 
 
Second stage model 
 
Yi =βXi + θSi + ui 
 
Yi is the outcome variable of interest (for example, Yi = 1 denotes employment 
of individual i and Yi = 0 denotes non-employment), Si is the fitted probability 
that individual i receives a sanction and Xi is a vector of covariates similar to 
the term in the first stage model, at individual and area level. We allow this 
error term and the error term εi of equation in the first stage to be correlated 
across observations from the same provider within an area. 
 
Outcomes of interest 
 
Employment status 
 
 
Whether a claimant was employed for at least one day in the 3, 6 
or 12 months after a sanction. 
 
Days 
employed/claiming 
 
Number of days in employment in the 3, 6 or 12 months after a sanction. 
 
Number of days claiming. 
 
Number of days neither claiming nor in employment. 
 
Number of days both claiming and in employment. 
 
Earnings 
 
Total earnings in the 3, 6 or 12 months after a sanction. 
 
Note  
1 This approach follows Bernhard Boockmann, Stephan L Thomsen and Thomas Walter. ‘Intensifying the  
use of benefit sanctions – an effective tool to shorten welfare receipt and speed up transitions to 
employment?’, IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 3:21, 2014. 
 
Source: National Audit Office  
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Figure 6  
Specification: control variables 
 
Independent variables Description 
Individual Age (in years). 
characteristics 
Sex (male or female).  
 Ethnic group (White, or Black or Minority Ethnic). 
 Disability status (disabled or not disabled). 
  
Opportunity type Indicator, assigned to claimants by the Department, of job-readiness. 
  
Duration on the Work Number of days between attachment to the Work Programme and 
Programme 1 February 2014. 
  
Fixed effects Provider fixed effects. 
 Contract package area fixed effects. 
  
Provider performance Average provider performance in the area (number of job outcome payments 
 divided by estimated caseload) between February and May 2014.1 
  
Further notes Included a small number of people with high earnings, rather than excluding 
 as outliers. 
 Included all Work Programme providers. 
 Included sanctions imposed for all reasons, not just sanctions for not taking 
 part in the Work Programme. 
 Included only people with an active claim on the day of the sanction 
 (a hypothetical sanction date for the control group). 
 Reset to zero the earnings of a small number of people with negative earnings. 
 
Note  
1 No data are available on participants per month. Instead, the number of ‘attachments’ (the number of 
people who start the Work Programme) has been adjusted to calculate caseload by subtracting people who 
left the Programme after finding work. 
 
Source: National Audit Office  
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Discussion of model specification 
 
24 To meaningfully interpret the results of our analysis we consider whether 
the model satisfies assumptions for local average treatment effects. Figure 7 
sets out these conditions. 
 
The exclusion principle 
 
25 Our approach assumes that variation in providers’ sanction referral rates reflects 
differences in how they use sanctions. We need to exclude the possibility that 
differences in referrals reflect other factors such as the quality of employment 
support, or claimant characteristics or behaviour. To take account of other possible 
relationships between sanctions and performance, we control for factors including: 
 
• 
 
• 
 
average provider performance at the contract level; 
 
provider fixed effects, which control for any differences across providers that 
may affect both the likelihood of a sanction and employment outcomes; 
 
• contract package area fixed effects, to control for differences between 
claimants in different areas; and 
 
• claimant characteristics, such as age. 
 
26 Although we include fewer claimant-level control variables than Boockmann et al 
 
(2014), we take advantage of the fact that claimants are allocated randomly to 
providers within areas. 
 
 
Figure 7  
Specification: technical conditions for local average treatment effects 
 
Assumption Requirement 
 
Exclusion The instrument is uncorrelated with the error  
term in the model. The instrument affects  
outcomes through a single known channel  
(ie the probability of a sanction). 
 
 
Strength of instrument The instrument is sufficiently strong as an  
explanatory variable. 
 
 
Monotonicity A claimant who would be sanctioned if placed  
with a provider with few sanctions would also 
be sanctioned by a provider with more 
sanctions. 
 
Stable unit treatment value The outcomes of one person, whether  
sanctioned or not, are not affected by 
whether someone else is sanctioned. 
 
Note 
 
Rationale for making assumption in this case 
 
Participants are randomly assigned to Work 
Programme providers. We included controls for 
provider performance and contract package area 
fixed effects. We control for differences in 
provider performance within area. 
 
F-statistic comparable to other studies in 
the literature, and significantly higher than 
the rule-of-thumb threshold. 
 
Not generally testable; the 
assumption appears reasonable. 
 
Not testable. This assumption is generally 
assumed to hold in previous academic 
research on benefit sanctions. 
 
1 Technical conditions based on Guido Imbens and Joshua Angrist, ‘Identification and estimation of local average treatment effects’, 
Econometrica, vol. 62, no.2, pp. 467-75, 1994. We have also added the stable unit treatment value assumption as a condition. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis  
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27 To test whether claimant characteristics differed across providers, within the 
same area, we examined the characteristics of claimants in our sample. We looked at 
five claimant characteristics (age, ethnicity, days in the work programme, sex and 
disability) and found that, consistent with random allocation, claimants differed very 
little, across providers within the same area, in terms of those characteristics (Figure 
8). 
 
 
Figure 8  
Claimant characteristics: Differences across providers within areas in our sample 
 
 Jobseeker’s Allowance Employment and 
   Support Allowance 
 Average (all areas)1 Average (difference Average (all areas)1 Average (difference 
  within areas)2  within areas)2 
Age in years 38 0.5 43 0.98 
Percentage of male 58 1.2 51.1 1.3 
Percentage of White 72.7 1.1 80.4 1.1 
Percentage of Disability 19.5 1.3 52.9 3.7 
Number of days spent on the 288 10.2 297 22.5 
Work Programme at the start     
of the treatment period3      
 
Notes  
1 The average value of the characteristic across the forty contracts. Unit of observation is the contract. 
 
2 The average value of the difference in the characteristic across providers within the same area. In the four areas with more than two 
providers, we calculate the difference by subtracting the lowest from the highest value of the characteristic. Unit of observation is the area. 
 
3 The average difference in number of days in the work programme is exaggerated because in one area, the Department replaced one 
provider with another. As a result, participants who switched providers appear as having being in the programme for a shorter time period. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data  
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Relevance and strength of the instrument 
 
28 We assume that our instrument – the sanction referral rate – is a good predictor 
of an individual’s likelihood of receiving a sanction (relevance). To test this 
assumption we looked at how well the instrumental variable predicts whether an 
individual received or did not receive a sanction. We found a statistically significant 
relationship (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9  
First-stage regression results 
 
Independent variable Jobseeker’s Allowance 
 
Employment and  
    Support Allowance 
 Coefficient1 Standard  Coefficient1 Standard 
  error   error 
  (clustered)2   (clustered)2 
Average sanction referral rate .0034*** .0002  .0073*** .0007 
(increase by one percentage point)      
Average performance (increase by -.017*** .003  -.001*** .0004 
one percentage point)      
Sex (male compared to female) .007*** .001  -.0002 .001 
Ethnic group (White compared to -.0003 .002  .004*** .001 
Black or Minority Ethnic)      
Age (increase by one year) -.0007*** .0001  -.0004*** .00005 
Days in the Work Programme at -0.00004*** .00001  -.00006*** .000009 
1 February 2014      
Contract package area fixed Yes   Yes 
effects      
Provider fixed effects Yes   Yes 
Opportunity type dummies Included   Included 
Disability status dummies Included   Included 
 
Note  
1 Clustered standard errors at the contract level. Significance is shown by asterisks. ***p≤.01; **p≤.05; *p≤.1, two 
tailed. Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data 
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29 To confirm that our results do not suffer from a ‘weak instrument’ problem 
we calculated the F-statistic for the instrumental variable (Figure 10). The F-
statistic is substantially higher than the rule-of-thumb value of 10, which 
sometimes indicates a weak instrument problem.8 
 
Stable unit treatment value 
 
30 We assume one person’s outcomes are not affected by whether someone 
else receives a sanction. 
 
31 It is not clear whether people are aware of other people’s sanctions or not. 
Sanction information is private, but it is possible that claimants may sometimes 
become aware that others have been sanctioned. If the assumption does not hold, our 
findings may be picking up some deterrence effects of sanctions, as well as the direct 
effects we intend to measure. 
 
 
Figure 10  
   Specification: test of strength of instrumental variables 
 
Instrumental variable F-statistic1 
Jobseeker’s Allowance sanction referral rate 135 
Employment and Support Allowance sanction referral rate 103 
 
Note  
1 The F-statistics relate to the instrumental variable from the first-stage regression. They are based on clustered 
standard errors at the contract level. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 See, D Staiger and J Stock, ‘Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments’, Econometrica, 65, 557-86, 1997. 
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Differences in approach 
 
32 Our approach differs from Boockmann et al (2014) in four respects (Figure 11). 
In particular, our instrument is continuous rather than binary and it captures sanction 
referral rates rather than sanction rates. We chose a continuous instrument to allow 
for more variation in the instrumental variable.9 We use sanction referral rates, not 
sanction rates, because the Department, not providers, imposes sanctions. 
Providers refer claimants to the Department for possible sanctions. 
 
 
Figure 11  
Differences from method taken by previous work 
 
National Audit Office Boockmann et al approach Explanation 
approach   
Continuous instrument Binary instrument Quality of instrument. 
  Our instrument allows for 
  analysis of greater variation 
  between contracts. 
   
Sanction referral rate Sanction rate Relevance of instrument. 
  On the Work Programme 
  providers refer claimants, but the 
  Department decides whether to 
  apply a sanction. 
   
Random allocation of claimants Large number of control variables Exclusion principle. We benefit 
and some control variables  from random allocation, which 
  makes it less important to include 
  additional control variables.  
 
Control for provider performance Does not control for differences  
in employment support across  
welfare agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
Note 
 
Exclusion principle. We 
benefit from data on 
performance, which reduces 
the possibility that the 
instrumental variable reflects 
differences in employment 
support across providers. 
 
1 Bernhard Boockmann, Stephan L Thomsen, and Thomas Walter, ‘Intensifying the use of benefit sanctions 
– an effective tool to shorten welfare receipt and speed up transitions to employment?’, IZA Journal of 
Labor Policy, 3:21, 2014. 
 
Source: National Audit Office  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 In Boockmann et al (2014), the instrument values differ based on whether the sanction rate of the welfare agency  
is above or below the median sanction rate of all welfare agencies. This means that two agencies with very 
different sanction rates could be assigned the same value for the instrument as long as they are both below or 
both above the median sanction rate. 
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Results 
 
 
Description of results 
 
33 Two types of claimants are subject to the possibility of sanctions on the Work 
Programme: unemployed Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants and sick and disabled 
Employment and Support Allowance claimants in the work-related activity group. 
 
Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants 
 
34 Our results for Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants show statistically significant 
effects in a number of outcomes (Figure 12). We find that sanctions: 
 
• 
 
• 
 
• 
 
• 
 
increase the probability of being in employment in later months; 
 
reduce the number of days claiming benefits; 
 
increase days in employment (accounting for about half the fall in days claiming); 
and 
 
increase days neither in employment nor claiming benefits (accounting for 
the remaining half of the fall in days claiming). 
 
35 For Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants the effect on earnings is statistically 
significant at 6 months but not at 3 or 12 months. There is no observable effect on 
days both claiming and employed. Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants can work for 
up to 16 hours a week without this affecting their claim. 
 
Employment and Support Allowance claimants 
 
36 Our results for Employment and Support Allowance claimants are 
different (Figure 13 on page 17). We find statistically significant effects that 
sanctions: 
 
• 
 
• 
 
• 
 
• 
 
• 
 
reduce the probability of employment in later months; 
 
increase the number of days claiming benefits and not working; 
 
increase days neither in employment nor claiming benefits; 
 
reduce the number of days both claiming and employed; and 
 
reduce earnings. 
 
37 These results differ markedly, both in terms of the size and direction of the 
effects, from those we obtained when we estimated an alternative ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model of the effect of sanctions on employment outcomes. The large 
difference between the OLS and instrumental variables results suggests the 
instrumental variables approach has been important in controlling for unobserved 
factors. 
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Figure 12  
Results: Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants 
 
Outcome Impact on outcome1 Standard error2 Significant3 
Probability of employment:    
within 3 months +71 percentage 9.8 percentage Yes 
 points points  
within 6 months +72 percentage 12.4 percentage Yes 
 points points  
within 12 months +98 percentage 18.3 percentage Yes 
 points points  
    
Days employed and not claiming:    
within 3 months +24 3.7 Yes 
within 6 months +86 8.5 Yes 
within 12 months +225 20.4 Yes 
    
Days neither employed nor claiming:    
within 3 month +29 4.1 Yes 
within 6 months +76 12.7 Yes 
within 12 months +236 41.1 Yes 
    
Days claiming and not employed:    
within 3 months -54 5.6 Yes 
within 6 months -163 10.1 Yes 
within 12 months -468 34 Yes 
    
Days claiming and employed:    
within 3 months +1 2.0 No 
within 6 months +2 3.9 No 
within 12 months +6 8.1 No 
    
Earnings from employment:    
within 3 months +£795 £746 No 
within 6 months +£3,229 £1,191 Yes 
within 12 months +£1,208 £2,207 No 
 
Notes  
1 Impact of receiving a sanction compared with not receiving a sanction. 
 
2 The standard errors are clustered at the contract level. 
 
3 We report that results are significant if the p-value was less than 0.1. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data  
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Figure 13  
Results: Employment and Support Allowance claimants 
 
Outcome Impact on outcome1 Standard error2 Significant3 
Probability of employment:    
within 3 months -36 percentage 4 percentage Yes 
 points points  
within 6 months -43 percentage 4.8 percentage Yes 
 points points  
within 12 months -63 percentage 11.4 percentage Yes 
 points points  
    
Days employed and not claiming:    
within 3 months -4 0.3 Yes 
within 6 months -14 1.5 Yes 
within 12 months -40 9.3 Yes 
    
Days neither employed nor claiming:    
within 3 month +3 0.5 Yes 
within 6 months +18 3.2 Yes 
within 12 months +23 6.4 Yes 
    
Days claiming and not employed:    
within 3 months +15 2.2 Yes 
within 6 months +38 6.5 Yes 
within 12 months +88 20.8 Yes 
    
Days claiming and employed:    
within 3 months -14 1.8 Yes 
within 6 months -41 4.0 Yes 
within 12 months -71 6.6 Yes 
    
Earnings from employment:    
within 3 months -£2,314 £393 Yes 
within 6 months -£2,810 £430 Yes 
within 12 months -£4,213 £884 Yes 
 
Notes  
1 Impact of receiving a sanction compared with not receiving a sanction. 
 
2 The standard errors are clustered at the contract level. 
 
3 We report that results are significant if the p-value was less than 0.1. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data  
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Interpretation of results 
 
38 Our results for the effect of sanctions on outcomes for Jobseeker’s Allowance 
are consistent with findings from other studies, which suggest sanctions both 
increase employment and exit from benefits without employment, and lead to low 
earnings in post‑sanction employment. However, it is important to take care in 
interpreting the results. 
 
Local average treatment effect 
 
39 The coefficients (Figure 12 and Figure 13) show the impact of sanctions on  
claimants who received a sanction because they were allocated to Work 
Programme providers who make greater use of sanctions. Our results measure 
the effect of intensifying the use of sanctions. 
 
40 Our findings cannot necessarily be extrapolated to sanction rates that we did not 
observe in our sample. For example, very large increases in sanction rates may not 
lead to equally large changes in employment. Neither should our results be used to 
estimate the impact of not using sanctions at all. 
 
Direct and indirect effects 
 
41 Our findings for Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants look only at the direct effect 
of receiving a sanction. Although we do not consider deterrence effects, other 
empirical studies suggest that the indirect effect also increases employment among 
unemployed claimants who do not receive sanctions. So, the total effect of 
Jobseeker’s Allowance sanctions on the likelihood of employment should be positive 
(Figure 14). 
 
42 We found that the direct effect of receiving a sanction reduced time spent in  
employment for Employment and Support Allowance claimants. It is natural to 
assume that claimants respond in similar ways to the possibility of a sanction and the 
experience of a sanction, just as Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants do. However, there 
is limited evidence and more work needs to be done in this area. 
 
 
Figure 14  
Direct and indirect effects of sanctions 
 
Effect of sanctions Claimants of Claimants of sickness 
 unemployment benefits and disability benefits 
Direct effect   
Probability of employment among Increases Decreases 
people who receive sanctions   
   
Indirect deterrence effect   
Probability of employment among Increases Not empirically tested 
people who do not receive sanctions   
   
Total effect   
Probability of employment Increases Unknown 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis and summary of research evidence  
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The size of effects 
 
43 Most of our results are statistically significant. But in interpreting the results it is 
also important to consider the size of the effects. Small effects can be statistically 
significant if standard errors are low. 
 
44 In some cases the size of our effects appear implausibly large. One reason  
is illustrated in Figure 15. We estimate the effect of a change in the probability 
of a sanction from 0% to 100%. But we produce this estimate by comparing 
smaller differences between providers in the probability of sanctions. 
 
45 Instrumental variables estimates can be sensitive to whether underlying 
conditions hold, such as the exclusion principle. To test whether our results are 
picking up other potential relationships between variables we would ideally use a 
falsification test. These would test whether other outcomes (which are highly unlikely 
to be related to sanctions) appear to be affected by differences in sanction referral 
rates across providers (our instrumental variable). We have not been able to identify 
suitable data for these tests. 
 
 
Figure 15  
Interpretation: illustration of coefficients in a linear model 
 
We estimate the effect of a change in the probability of a sanction from 0% to 100%. But we produce this 
estimate by comparing smaller differences between providers in the probability of sanctions 
 
Outcome  
(eg employment) 
 
 
Reported 
     
Actual relationship between 
     
     
sanctions and outcomes 
coefficient 
 
Sample 
 
    
     
      
  variation     
       
        
 
 
   Treatment 
   
(eg probability of 
0 1 a sanction)  
 
Sample variation 
 
Source: National Audit Office  
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The nature of responses to sanctions 
 
46 Our analysis suggests further work should be done to understand how people 
respond to sanctions. For example, our model expresses the average impact of 
sanctions on employment outcomes. The average fall in days spent claiming is split 
relatively equally between higher employment and higher inactivity. The model does 
not distinguish between two possibilities: 
 
• 
 
• 
 
people both increasing their time spent in work and in inactivity; and 
some people going into employment and other people becoming inactive. 
 
47 Similarly, further work could be done to understand the pattern of earnings 
responses. In our findings earnings increases appear relatively small given the 
large coefficients on employment; this suggests that employment spells may not 
represent full-time work or that average wages are affected. 
 
Generalising from our results to other groups 
 
48 Our analysis is based on Work Programme participants who meet our 
conditions. Although we restrict our sample, the characteristics of the individuals in 
our sample are very similar to the characteristics of Work Programme claimants in 
general (Figure 16 overleaf). 
 
49 Other types of claimants could respond to sanctions differently. In Figure 17 
on page 22) we consider some of the limitations and our assessment of the wider 
relevance of our results. It is likely that our findings are relevant to some extent for 
existing and emerging claimant groups under new policies and programmes. We 
consider that our findings support the case for further investigation by the 
Department and others of the impacts of sanctions on benefit claimants, and greater 
availability and use of Department data to explore these impacts. 
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Figure 16  
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Jobseeker’s Allowance 
 
Employment and   
    Support Allowance 
 Sample Population1  Sample Population2 
Number of observations 95,374 1,447,606  130,582 333,978 
Percentage who received 9.1 N/A  3.2 N/A 
a sanction in the treatment period      
Average age in years 38 35  43 42 
Percentage male 58 66  51 51 
Percentage White 74 74  82 81 
Average number of days spent on 289 N/A  294 N/A 
the Work Programme at the start of      
the treatment period      
Contract with the highest sanction 33 33  10 10 
referral rate (%)      
Contract with the lowest sanction 5 5  0.5 0.5 
referral rate (%)      
Sanction referral rate mean 14 (6) 14 (6)  4 (2) 4 (2) 
(standard deviation)      
 
Notes  
1 All individuals who were claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance at the time of referral to the Work 
Programme. Data cover the period from the introduction of the Work Programme to April 2016. 
 
2 All individuals who were claiming Employment and Support Allowance at the time of referral to the 
Work Programme. Data cover the period from the introduction of the Work Programme to April 2016. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data  
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Figure 17  
Interpretation: wider relevance of results1 
 
Limitation Why results may not apply widely 
 
Long claim duration Work Programme participants have 
                                           been claiming benefits for longer than 
                                           average. 
 
 
Time period Claimant responses to sanctions may  
change over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age Younger claimants have higher  
employment outcomes and receive  
more sanctions. 
 
Length of observation February to May 2014 could be an 
                                           unrepresentative period. 
 
Impact this may make 
 
May be less responsive. Work Programme participants might be 
less sensitive to interventions and sanctions given their long claim 
histories. 
 
 
No clear difference. It is not clear why responses in 2014 would be 
atypical. The labour market improved from January 2013, so 
claimants in earlier periods may have been less able to respond to 
sanctions. Future analysis could look at other time periods. 
 
From October 2012, the Department introduced the Work 
Programme for Employment and Support Allowance claimants 
who were further from the labour market. By 2014, providers 
should have overcome any initial disruption to support. 
 
Uncertain impact. The claimants we analysed are older than the 
average Jobseeker’s Allowance claimant. 
 
No clear difference. Month of the year could affect whether 
claimants are referred for sanctions and availability of jobs.  
We avoided December to January as fewer people are referred 
around Christmas. 
 
First sanction only We may have selected people who         
                                           were disproportionately likely to   
                                           respond positively to a sanction. 
 
 
Multiple sanctions People with multiple sanctions may  
respond differently to people who  
receive one sanction. 
 
May be more responsive. On average, the claimants we 
analysed spent a year on the Work Programme before being 
sanctioned. We excluded claimants who had already been 
sanctioned. 
 
May be more responsive. Most claimants only get one 
sanction, so our analysis is useful for understanding their 
behaviour. 
We excluded claimants who had more than one sanction in the 
period of observation. Successive sanctions may have weaker 
effects as the fact that someone is still on benefits suggests 
they are less responsive to the effects of previous sanctions. 
 
Support model                   The Work Programme differs  
                                           from other employment programmes.   
                                           Sanction responses may differ. 
 
Uncertain impact. It is possible that programme-specific factors 
matter; but welfare-to-work programmes are common and it is not 
clear why and in which direction responses might differ. 
 
International evidence finds that the impact of sanctions is 
broadly similar between different programmes in the same 
country.2 
 
Benefit Responses to Universal Credit sanctions  
                                           may differ from responses to Jobseeker’s    
                                           Allowance sanctions. 
 
 
Notes 
 
Uncertain impact. The Department will continue to support 
the types of claimants we analysed, but Universal Credit may 
change how they respond to sanctions. Rules and processes 
have been converging with Universal Credit, although this was 
more limited in 2014. 
 
1 The results of our analysis apply to the group of Work Programme participants we identified in specifying our model. This table examines 
the extent to which our findings may or may not be informative about the effect of sanctions on other groups of claimants. 
 
2 See, Japp H Abbring, Gerard J van den Berg and Jan C van Ours, ‘The effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition 
rate from unemployment to employment’, Economic Journal, vol. 115, pp. 602-30, 2005. 
Source: National Audit Office analysis  
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Discussion and limitations 
 
50 Any econometric analysis of this kind makes certain methodological choices and 
is limited by the availability and accuracy of data. Here we discuss some of the 
potential limitations of our approach. Our analysis of the effects of sanctions is 
preliminary and needs further investigation. Our value-for-money report Benefit 
sanctions recommends that the Department should build on this analysis and 
improve the evidence base for sanction design. 
 
Data availability and quality 
 
51 A common limitation in the analysis of the effects of sanctions is the availability 
of relevant data. For example, in our analysis we do not have complete data on the 
outcomes that people experience after a sanction. Self-employment income is not 
included in the earnings data we used to identify employment spells and earnings. 
Figure 18 summarises some of the possible limitations of the data and discusses 
their likely impact. 
 
 
Figure 18  
Robustness: data limitations 
 
Issue Likely impact 
 
Self-employment data are not available Unknown. This information is missing for both the control  
and treatment groups. Around 15% of the jobs found by  
Work Programme participants were in self-employment. 
 
National Insurance numbers are missing  
for 2% of sanctioned claimants 
 
 
 
Information on educational attainment 
and skills is not available 
 
 
Source: National Audit Office 
 
Unlikely to have a significant effect. It is not likely  
that individuals without National Insurance numbers  
are systematically different from those who have them in  
ways that could affect the results. 
 
Unlikely to have a significant effect. The random 
assignment of claimants to providers makes controlling 
for individual-level variables less important once 
contract package area fixed effects are included.  
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52 There are restrictions on data in all academic studies of sanctions, 
including those supplied by the Department when we asked for their evidence 
base for sanctions (Figure 19 overleaf). 
 
Technical choices 
 
53 The way an econometric model is specified can lead to differences in results. One 
way to test the robustness of results is to test different specifications to see if results 
are very different or broadly consistent. 
 
54 In Figures 20 to 23 we show the results of our tests of different assumptions: 
 
• 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• 
 
Figure 20 on page 26 and Figure 21 on page 27 compare results when we 
define Work Programme caseloads differently. Because we do not have 
reliable data for active caseloads on the Work Programme we had to estimate 
this using attachment and performance data. We tested different 
specifications and found consistent results. 
 
Figure 22 on page 28 and Figure 23 on page 29 compare results using different 
standard errors. In our main results we use clustered standard errors. These 
take account of the fact that our data are grouped (by Work Programme 
contract, for example). Clustered standard errors account for the risk that 
observations in a group can be correlated. We compare these clustered 
standard errors with the conventional, unclustered standard errors. Our 
comparison shows that our clustered standard errors are smaller than our 
conventional estimates, so using conventional standard errors would mean that 
some results were not statistically significant. Clustering standard errors also 
addresses potential technical concerns around heteroscedasticity (differences in 
the variation of responses across the sample). 
 
55 Given the strong methodological preference for clustered standard errors we 
have presented those in our main results. 
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Figure 19  
Robustness: comparison of data used in international evidence cited by the Department 
 
 
Coverage 
 
Data 
  
    
Study Country, group and time Distinguishes Administrative Administrative Quality of 
 period covered reasons for data on data on outcome data 
  leaving benefits outcomes sanctions  
NAO (2016)1 Great Britain; Jobseeker’s    Self-employment 
 Allowance and Employment and    income missing 
 Support Allowance claimants on     
 the Work Programme; 2014     
Abbring et al Netherlands; Unemployment    Self-employment 
(2005)2 Insurance claimants; 16 (out of    income missing 
 19) Unemployment Insurance     
 agencies; 1992 to 1993     
Van der Klaauw Rotterdam, Netherlands; people    Outcomes are 
et al (2013)3 aged 16 to 60; 2000 to 2003    self-reported 
Arni et al (2013)4 Seven cantons in Switzerland;    Employment 
 people aged 30 to 55; 1998    spells with very 
 to 2003    low earnings are 
     not included 
Van den Berg et al Rotterdam, Netherlands; welfare    Outcomes are 
(2004)5 recipients, 1994    self-reported 
Boockmann et al Germany; claimants aged 18    Self-employment 
(2014)6 to 57 at 154 of 439 welfare    and income from 
 agencies; 2003 to 2006    very low paid work 
     is missing 
Svarer (2011)7 Denmark; people aged 26 to 65;    Does not 
 2003 to 2005    distinguish 
     between inactivity 
     and employment 
 
Notes  
1 Paragraphs 3.9 to 3.11 of Comptroller & Auditor General, Benefit sanctions, HC 628, Session 2016-17, National Audit Office, November 2016. 
 
2 Jaap H Abbring, Gerard J van den Berg and Jan C van Ours, ‘The effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from 
unemployment to employment’, Economic Journal, vol. 115, pp. 602-630, 2005. 
 
3 Bas Van der Klaauw and Jan C van Ours, ‘Carrot and Stick: How re-employment bonuses and benefit sanctions affect exit rates from 
welfare’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 28, pp. 275-96, 2013. 
 
4 Patrick Arni, Rafael Lalive and Jan C van Ours, ‘How effective are unemployment benefit sanctions? Looking beyond unemployment exit’, Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, vol. 28, pp. 1153-78, 2013. 
 
5 Gerard Van den Berg, Bas Van der Klaauw and J van Ours, ‘Punitive sanctions and the transition rate from welfare to work’, Journal of Labor 
Economics, vol. 22, pp. 211-41, 2004. 
 
6 Bernhard Boockman, Stephan L Thomsen and Thomas Walter, ‘Intensifying the use of benefit sanctions - an effective tool to shorten welfare receipt 
and speed up transitions to employment?’, IZA Journal of Labor Policy 3:21, 2014. 
 
7 Michael Svarer, ‘The effect of sanctions on exit from unemployment: evidence from Denmark’, Economica, vol. 78, pp. 751-78, 2011. 
 
8 Comparisons across different studies should be treated with caution given different data, specifications and methodologies. 
 
Source: National Audit Office  
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Figure 20  
Caseload specification – Jobseeker’s Allowance results 
 
Sensitivity of our results to our method of estimating the Work Programme caseload 
 
Outcome Baseline1 Alternative 12 Alternative 23 
 
Probability of employment: 
 
within 3 months +71 percentage points +71 percentage points +69 percentage points 
within 6 months +72 percentage points +75 percentage points +75 percentage points 
within 12 months +98 percentage points +98 percentage points +100 percentage points 
    
Days employed and not claiming:    
within 3 months +24 +24 +24 
within 6 months +86 +86 +85 
within 12 months +225 +226 +226 
    
Days neither employed nor claiming:    
within 3 month +29 +28 +28 
within 6 months +76 +73 +75 
within 12 months +236 +230 +235 
    
Days claiming and not employed:    
within 3 months -54 -53 -53 
within 6 months -163 -161 -162 
within 12 months -468 -463 -469 
    
Days claiming and employed:    
within 3 months +1 +1 +1 
within 6 months +2 +2 +2 
within 12 months +6 +7 +8 
    
Earnings from employment:    
within 3 months +£795 +£811 +£951 
within 6 months +£3,229 +£3,182 +£3,339 
within 12 months +£1,208 +£599 +£342 
 
Notes  
1 For a given month we calculate the caseload by subtracting the cumulative job outcomes from the cumulative attachments for the previous 24 months. 
 
2 For a given month we calculate the caseload by subtracting the cumulative job outcomes from the previous 18 months from the cumulative attachments 
from the previous 24 months. We exclude the first 6 months of outcomes when calculating the caseload because providers only receive payments once 
participants complete 6 months in employment. 
 
3 We calculate the caseload by subtracting the cumulative job outcomes from the cumulative attachments in a 24-month period. The 24-month period differs 
between attachments and outcomes. For attachments we use the 24 preceding months. The 24-month period for outcomes starts at 18 months before any 
given month and lasts for an additional 6 months. This method of calculating the caseload aims to reflect the fact that an individual who is at work in any 
given month can only be counted as an outcome once they have completed 6 months of employment. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data  
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Figure 21  
Caseload specification – Employment and Support Allowance results 
 
The sensitivity of our results to our method of estimating the Work Programme caseload 
 
Outcome Baseline1 Alternative 12 Alternative 23 
 
Probability of employment: 
 
within 3 months -36 percentage points 
 
within 6 months -43 percentage points 
 
within 12 months -63 percentage points  
 
-38 percentage points 
-44 percentage points 
-65 percentage points 
 
-38 percentage points 
-45 percentage points 
-65 percentage points 
 
Days employed and not claiming:    
within 3 months -4 -4 -4 
within 6 months -14 -15 -16 
within 12 months -40 -42 -42 
    
Days neither employed nor claiming:    
within 3 month +3 +3 +3 
within 6 months +18 +18 +19 
within 12 months +23 +25 +26 
    
Days claiming and not employed:    
within 3 months +15 +16 +16 
within 6 months +38 +40 +40 
within 12 months +88 +91 +91 
    
Days claiming and employed:    
within 3 months -14 -15 -15 
within 6 months -41 -43 -43 
within 12 months -71 -74 -75 
    
Earnings from employment:    
within 3 months -£2,314 -£2,481 -£2,500 
within 6 months -£2,810 -£2,999 -£3,024 
within 12 months -£4,213 -£4,463 -£4,494 
 
Notes  
1 For a given month we calculate the caseload by subtracting the cumulative job outcomes from the cumulative attachments for the previous 24 months. 
 
2 For a given month we calculate the caseload by subtracting the cumulative job outcomes from the previous 18 months from the cumulative attachments 
from the previous 24 months. We exclude the first 6 months of outcomes when calculating the caseload because providers only receive payments once 
participants complete 6 months in employment. 
 
3 We calculate the caseload by subtracting the cumulative job outcomes from the cumulative attachments in a 24-month period. The 24-month period differs 
between attachments and outcomes. For attachments we use the 24 preceding months. The 24-month period for outcomes starts at 18 months before any 
given month and lasts for an additional 6 months. This method of calculating the caseload aims to reflect the fact that an individual who is at work in any 
given month can only be counted as an outcome once they have completed 6 months of employment. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data  
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Figure 22  
Standard error specification – Jobseeker’s Allowance 
 
The sensitivity of our results to our method of estimating standard errors   
Outcome Impact on outcome Standard error Standard error 
  (clustered)1 (not clustered)1 
Probability of employment:    
within 3 months +71 percentage points 9.8*** 35.9** 
within 6 months +72 percentage points 12.4*** 42.4* 
within 12 months +98 percentage points 18.3*** 48.4** 
    
Days employed and not claiming:    
within 3 months +24 3.7*** 14.5* 
within 6 months +86 8.5*** 40.5** 
within 12 months +225 20.4*** 98.8** 
    
Days neither employed nor claiming:    
within 3 month +29 4.1*** 14.3** 
within 6 months +76 12.7*** 35.3** 
within 12 months +236 41.1*** 93.5*** 
    
Days claiming and not employed:    
within 3 months -54 5.6*** 23.7*** 
within 6 months -163 10.1*** 61*** 
within 12 months -468 34*** 155.5*** 
    
Days claiming and employed:    
within 3 months +1 2.0 8.3 
within 6 months +2 3.9 19.1 
within 12 months +6 8.1 39.5 
    
Earnings from employment:    
within 3 months +£795 £746 £1,822 
within 6 months +£3,229 £1,191*** £3,495 
within 12 months +£1,208 £2,207 £10,981 
 
Note  
1 Asterisks signify different levels of statistical significance of the corresponding coefficients shown. Three asterisks (***) show a p-value 
smaller than 0.01, two asterisks (**) show a p-value smaller than 0.05 and one asterisk (*) a p-value smaller than 0.1. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data  
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Figure 23  
Standard error specification – Employment and Support Allowance 
 
The sensitivity of our results to our method of estimating standard errors 
 
Outcome Impact on outcome Standard error Standard error  
(clustered)1 (not clustered)1 
 
Probability of employment:    
within 3 months -36 percentage points 4*** 15.1*** 
within 6 months -43 percentage points 4.8*** 20.5** 
within 12 months -63 percentage points 11.4*** 26.4*** 
    
Days employed and not claiming:    
within 3 months -4 0.3*** 3.3 
within 6 months -14 1.5*** 10.4 
within 12 months -40 9.3*** 29.6 
    
Days neither employed nor claiming:    
within 3 month +3 0.5*** 6.3 
within 6 months +18 3.2*** 17.4 
within 12 months +23 6.4*** 47.7 
    
Days claiming and not employed:    
within 3 months +15 2.2*** 9.5 
within 6 months +38 6.5*** 25.2 
within 12 months +88 20.8*** 65.7 
    
Days claiming and employed:    
within 3 months -14 1.8*** 6.0*** 
within 6 months -41 4.0*** 15.0*** 
within 12 months -71 6.6*** 31.2** 
    
Earnings from employment:    
within 3 months -£2,314 £393*** £1,033** 
within 6 months -£2,810 £430*** £1,293** 
within 12 months -£4,213 £884*** £2,651 
 
Note  
1 Asterisks signify different levels of statistical significance of the corresponding coefficients shown. Three asterisks (***) indicate a p-value smaller than 
0.01, two asterisks (**) indicate a p-value smaller than 0.05 and one asterisk (*) a p-value smaller than 0.1. 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Work & Pensions data  
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Suggestions for future work 
 
56 Future work can make use of the Department’s administrative data to expand 
the scope of our analysis. Our findings are preliminary and we recommend that they 
are used to inform further investigation of the impact of sanctions on claimants. In 
particular, we suggest that future work considers: 
 
a alternative estimation techniques such as duration models – these models do 
not suffer from the limitations associated with instrumental variables;10 
 
b deterrence effects of benefit sanctions – this is a less developed research area 
but previous work provides some guidance on how to examine these issues;11 
 
c direct and indirect impacts on other Employment and Support Allowance 
claimants; 
 
d impacts of variation between comparable jobcentres using the Department’s 
data on jobcentre referrals and sanctions; 
 
e impacts of first and subsequent referrals and sanctions at different times in 
claims, and for different reasons; 
 
f the quality of work that claimants find, including how sanctions affect earnings. 
This will be important as the Department starts to use evidence of earnings as 
a measure of performance under Universal Credit; and 
 
g whether different groups of people respond differently to sanctions, and why 
they become inactive. 
 
Process and quality review 
 
57 In designing the analysis we benefited from advice from external experts, in 
particular Professor Gerard van den Berg of the University of Bristol and Jonathan 
Portes of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, and from 
discussions with Department analysts through October and early November 2016 
about benefit data and underlying systems. While we have tried to reflect all 
comments in our discussion of our approach and its limitations, we have not 
undertaken a full peer review, and we remain responsible for any weaknesses in our 
method or errors in our analysis. 
 
58 We have recommended that the Department undertakes further analysis of its 
data and supports wider access to researchers in this area. We conducted our 
analysis using Department systems in a limited time period. We received full access 
to the required data towards the end of August 2016, and sent our findings and 
underlying code to the Department at the end of September 2016. We conducted our 
analysis on site on Department computers using SAS v. 5.1 software and so are not 
able to provide access to the data for replication purposes. 
 
 
 
10 See, for example, Gerard van den Berg, Bas van der Klaauw and J van Ours, ‘Punitive sanctions and the transition 
rate from welfare to work’, Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 22, pp. 211-41, 2004. 
11 See, for example, Rafael Lalive, Jan C van Ours and Josef Zweimüller, ‘The effect of benefit sanctions on the duration 
of unemployment’, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 3 (6), pp. 1386-417, 2005. 
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